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The story of wages and mobility, both at the ﬁrm and at the worker level,
is one that until recently could not have been told. In France, matched
employer-employee data was collected since the middle of the 1970s, but
only in the past few years has computer power, storage, and ease of use
been enough to allow systematic study of the links between employee and
ﬁrm characteristics. In the spirit of the other contributions to this book, we
will sift the wage structure in France during the twenty years between 1976
and 1996 through the sieve of intra- and interﬁrm heterogeneity. Section
11.2 describes the data used, section 11.3 paints the picture of wage move-
ments, while section 11.4 analyzes wage dispersion and variation through
some sample statistics.
11.2 Description of the Data Used: The DADS
The Déclaration Annuelles de Données Sociales(DADS) is a longitudinal
matched employer-employee data source collected by the Institut National
de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) and maintained in the
Division des Revenus/Exploitation des Fichiers Administratifs at INSEE.
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work engendered by it, can never be overstated.The data are based on a mandatory employer report of the gross earnings
of each employee subject to French payroll taxes. The universe includes all
statutory employed persons. Our analysis sample covers all individuals em-
ployed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered
years, with civil servants excluded. Our analysis sample runs from 1976
through 1996, with 1981, 1983, and 1990 excluded because the extracts
from the master payroll records were not built for those years. The initial
data set contained sixteen million observations. Each observation corre-
sponds to a unique enterprise-individual-year combination. The observa-
tion includes an identiﬁer that corresponds to the employee (called NNI in
the following) and an identiﬁer that corresponds to the enterprise (SIREN).
For each observation, we have information on the number of days dur-
ing the calendar year the individual worked in the establishment, as well as
the full-time/part-time/intermittent/at-home work status of the employee.
Each observation also includes, in addition to the variables listed in the pre-
ceding, the sex, month, year, and place of birth; occupation; total net nom-
inal earnings during the year and annualized gross nominal earnings dur-
ing the year for the individual; as well as the location and industry of the
employing establishment. Nominal values were deﬂated by the consumer
price index, and are written as thousands of 1980 French francs (FF).
11.2.1 Observation Selection, Variable Creation, and Imputation
An observation is identiﬁed by a combination of two identiﬁers, the ﬁrm
ID and the person ID. The SIREN number has an internal structure that
allows a check for coding errors. But the NNI number has no such internal
control. Although 90 percent of current DADS information is ﬁled by the
responding ﬁrm using an electronic medium (tape or diskette), the situa-
tion in the 1980s was quite diﬀerent. In that era, INSEE had to perform
data entry by keypunch from paper forms. Entry errors in the NNI oc-
curred (exchange of two digits of the NNI, error in one of the digits, etc.).
This phenomenon is well known at INSEE but, despite many attempts, no
general way of solving this problem was found. As a consequence, some
observations have a NNI-year-SIREN combination such that no other ob-
servation has the same NNI. As a joint product, some NNI-SIREN com-
binations have a unique missing year. Consider now the case of a worker
with observations in, say, 1978 and 1980 in the same enterprise (SIREN)
but no observation for 1979. If true, this history would mean that the
worker was employed until some date in 1978 (depending on the number of
days worked, December 31 most likely) and also employed after some date
in 1980 (depending on the number of days worked, January 1 most likely)
in this ﬁrm but not employed at all during year 1979. This is very improb-
able, in particular because there is a layoﬀ procedure in France in which
workers may be recalled by their ﬁrms after some period of unemployment.
Suggestions of D. Verger (head of the Division Revenus, in charge of the
DADS at the beginning of the 1990s) led us to adopt the following solution.
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SIREN combination exists for the preceding and the following year, we
created an observation for the missing year with the same NNI-SIREN
combination. (This added 193,148 observations.) Earnings are computed
as the geometric mean of the preceding and following wages (in real terms).
All other variables are taken at their preceding year value.
Because of the 1982 and 1990 Census, the 1981, 1983, and 1990 DADS
data were not available. We used the same principle as the one described in
the preceding to impute missing observations. Hence, imputation was per-
formed only for those individuals that were present in the same ﬁrm in 1980
and 1982 or 1982 and 1984 or 1989 and 1991. (This added 759,017 obser-
vations to the sample.) All variables were imputed as in the preceding.
11.2.2 Multiple Jobs
Until now, nothing in our procedure rules out multiple job holding. Mul-
tiple jobs are diﬃcult to handle in our data because we only have informa-
tion on the number of days worked in each NNI-year-SIREN combination.
Hence, we do not know the starting and the ending date of the spell in that
year (for all spells that last less than 360 days, the maximum). To be able to
build spells of employment for each worker, we only kept those individuals
who never had strictly more than three employers in any year. We computed
the number of employers any worker had in a year. We kept in our analysis
ﬁle those workers who had at most three diﬀerent employers in each year.
At this stage, our sample only contains workers who hold at most three
simultaneous jobs in a given year. Then we computed the sum of all days
worked in each year. If this number was strictly larger than 720 days for
some year, that is, the worker necessarily had three simultaneous jobs at
some point of this year, we deleted the individual from our sample.
We deﬁne a job spell as an uninterrupted period of employment for a
given NNI in a given SIREN over, possibly, many years.
11.2.3 Beginning and End of Job Spells
Because workers can have at most three types of job spells in a year, the
possible sequence of job spells are limited. This allows us to compute ex-
actly the beginning and the ending dates of a job spell. First, we identiﬁed
for each individual the starting and the end years of a job spell. Then we
ordered these sequences. The diﬀerent cases are the following:
When a job spell starts in year t but ends after December 31 of the same
year, we compute the starting date within year t as (360 – DPt)/360, where
DPt denotes the number of days worked in year t.
The end date within year t of a spell is computed symmetrically if the
spell started before year t as (DPt – 360)/360.
When a spell starts and ends the same year, and if there is no simultane-
ous job this year, the spell starts at the beginning of the year (January 1).
When a worker has multiple spells that all start and end the same year,
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as the sum of days worked in this year is less than or equal to 360, the job
spells are put in sequence one after the other, the ﬁrst one starting January 1.
Any spell with a number of days worked, DP1,tsuch that DP1,t DPk,t> 360
where k 2,3 (the other two potential spells), is also placed January 1. This
ﬁnishes when the three spells (maximum possible) have been coded.
If a job spell ends in year t but started at some previous date, any other
job spell that took place the same year t will start at the end of this spell if
the total number of days worked for these two spells is smaller or equal to
360 but starts January 1 otherwise. The third spell, if it exists, is placed af-
ter the ﬁrst of the two spells for which the sum is smaller or equal to 360.
The symmetric principles apply whenever a spell starts in year tand ends
after December 31 for all spells that took place in year t.
At the end of this procedure, whenever a worker held three jobs simul-
taneously (think of a worker with three spells in a given year that all last
200 days), all of his or her observations were deleted. Altogether, both pro-
cedures for ﬁnding workers holding three simultaneous jobs or more elim-
inated from the sample 2,223,859 observations that correspond to 115,637
workers.
11.2.4 Job Duration
Individuals fell into two categories with respect to the calculation of job
duration: those for whom the ﬁrst year of observation was in 1976 with 360
worked days in that year and those that appear in the sample after this date
or had less than 360 days of work in 1976. For the ﬁrst category, we esti-
mated the expected length of the in-progress employment spell by regres-
sion analysis using a supplementary survey, the 1978 Enquête sur la Struc-
ture des Salaires (ESS; Salary Structure Survey). In this survey, respondent
establishments provided information on seniority, occupation, date of
birth, industry, and work location for a scientiﬁc sample of their employees.
Using this information, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999 estimated
separate regressions for men and women that we use to predict seniority for
the in-progress spells in 1976 with 360 days worked (all coeﬃcients are re-
ported in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis; see, in particular, the data ap-
pendix).
Finally, as in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), we eliminated ob-
servations for which the logarithm of the real annualized total compensa-
tion cost was more than ﬁve standard deviations away from its predicted
value based on a linear regression model of this variable on sex, region, ex-
perience, and education (see once more the data appendix in Abowd, Kra-
marz, and Margolis).
Having done all these selections and imputations, the ﬁnal data set that
we use contains 13,770,082 observations, corresponding to 1,682,080 indi-
viduals and 515,557 ﬁrms. For international comparison purposes, only
observations for full-time jobs were selected. This limits a potential bias
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share of women in the labor force also increased, by more than 5 percent-
age points, so we could potentially ﬁnd diﬀerent results if we produced sep-
arate tables by gender.
The years initially selected were 1977, 1979, 1987, 1989, 1993, and 1996,
since the sample period goes from 1976 to 1996. As described in the pre-
ceding, the years 1981, 1983 and 1990 are not available, and, unfortunately,
there was a complete overhaul of the computerized programs of the DADS
in 1993. This last change made 1993 and 1994 too special to be useable.
Hence, we selected 1977, 1979, 1989, 1996, and only used 1987 when it was
useful to compute ten-year-long diﬀerences.
11.2.5 The Eﬀect of the Sampling Scheme on Our Statistics
Our data only includes workers born on October of even-numbered
years. Combined with missing information on the year and month of birth
for some observations, the data is constructed so that it represents exactly
1/25 of the total number of observations, and hence 1/25 of the number of
workers.
This sample selection procedure leads to unbiased worker-dependent
statistics and is perfectly appropriate for workercentric models (job
changes, wages, work experience, seniority, etc.).
However, some within-ﬁrm, second-order statistics will be inconsistent,
as ﬁrm size is ﬁxed in the data. To see this, consider an economy where
there are J ﬁrms of the same size N, the sampling is uniform, and the size
of the ﬁrm is large enough that every ﬁrm has n sampled workers (the sam-
pling ratio is thus n/N). All (log-) wages are drawn from the same N( , 2)
distribution. This entails that within-ﬁrm mean wage follows a N( ,  2/n)
distribution. Average within-ﬁrm wage is thus N( ,  2/nJ), so this statistic
is consistent. The standard deviation of the within-ﬁrm mean wage is not
consistent, however.
The within-ﬁrm mean wage is Xj   (1/n) iXij, and the variance of this
within-ﬁrm mean wage is:
Y   ∑
j
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Hence, as the number of ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity, the standard deviation of
within-ﬁrm mean wage will converge to  / n   (recall, n is the ﬁrm size). In
our case, the sampling ratio is 1/25, thus in this simplistic economy, the
standard deviation of the within-ﬁrm average wage will be oﬀ by a factor
of ﬁve (compare with ﬁgure I.3 in Lazear and Shaw’s introduction in this






















Wage Structure in France, 1977–96 4050.15). Now consider the case where ﬁrms have diﬀerent sizes (nj), and
wages are drawn from the same distribution as before. Then the standard
deviation of the within-ﬁrm mean wage will be a pure reﬂection of the dis-
tribution of ﬁrm sizes. Finally, if ﬁrms have varying mean wages and diﬀer-
ent within-ﬁrm dispersions, the statistic will reﬂect a complex mixture of
size, average pay structure, and ﬁrm dispersion. This happens in every case,
with or without sampling.
By contrast, ﬁgure I.5 in Lazear and Shaw’s introduction in this volume
shows that the average of the standard deviation by ﬁrm is not very diﬀer-
ent in France, as the standard deviation is only aﬀected in its variance by
the sampling scheme. In this case, the within-ﬁrm variance is:
Sj   ∑
i
X 2





thus ESj    2, and by the law of large numbers the mean of the standard
deviation will converge to its true value of  2. Note, however, that the vari-
ance can only be computed when there are at least two observations for the
given year; hence, our statistic will tend to overrepresent larger ﬁrms.
11.3 Wage Institutions in France: A Bird’s-Eye View
11.3.1 The Minimum Wage
Since 1951, French industry has been subject to a national minimum
wage (called the SMIC since the revisions to the relevant law in 1971) that
is indexed to the rate of change in consumer prices and to the average blue-
collar wage rate.1
Figures 11.1 and 11.2 depict the changes in the (real) minima over the
sample period (with the minimum wage in the United States as a useful
comparison). The French SMIC started its very sharp increase in the be-
ginning of the 1970s. In the rest of the sample period, the French SMIC
continued its increase, partly mandated by one-shot increases and partly
by formulaic increases. Note, however, that minimum wage rates delivered
to the worker do not present the ﬁrm’s minimum labor costs. Indeed, the
structure of payroll taxes that augment wages as a part of labor cost has
changed in France. After a constant increase in payroll tax rates from the
early 1970s, they dropped sharply in 1994 and even more so in the ensuing
years (see Kramarz and Philippon 2001) as a part of an explicit program to
lower total labor costs for workers at the minimum wage.
11.3.2 Wage Bargaining: The French Way
During the sample period, the French labor market institutions were
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1. This section and the following borrow heavily from work by Abowd et al. (2005).environment. In the 1970s, centralized collective bargaining agreements
(conventions collectives de branches) were the basic elements of the negoti-
ation process in France. The diﬀerent industrial sectors had collective
agreements that were negotiated by groups of unions and employer associ-
ations. These agreements were binding on the negotiating parties. The
complete agreement was then typically extended to cover the entire indus-
try (or region) by the Ministry of Labor and was then made binding on
workers and ﬁrms that were not party to the original negotiation (see Mar-
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Fig. 11.1 Changes in the real minimum cost
Source: Kramarz and Philippon (2001).
Fig. 11.2 Changes in the real minimum cost and the real minimum wage. Reduc-
tion of employer-paid payroll taxes
Source: Kramarz and Philippon (2001).golis 1994). More than 95 percent of the workforce was covered by these
collective bargaining agreements at the end of the 1980s, while union mem-
bership was approximately 10 percent. The collective agreements speciﬁed
a set of minimum wages and wage progressions for the occupational cate-
gories covered by the negotiations (sometimes called a wage grid). But, be-
ginning in 1982, the lois Auroux (a set of revisions to the body of labor law
named after the Minister of Labor at the time) required ﬁrms with at least
ﬁfty employees to negotiate ﬁrm-level collective agreements (accords d’en-
treprise). Although ﬁrms were explicitly not obligated to conclude an
agreement, 65 percent of the workforce were employed at establishments
or businesses where ﬁrm-level negotiations occurred either through the
union delegates or some other worker representative. Among this 65 per-
cent of the workforce, only three-quarters of the workers ended up with an
agreement as a result of these negotiations. Finally, the percentage of the
workforce covered by some establishment or ﬁrm-level agreement on
wages is approximately 40 percent in 1992. The law required that the ﬁrm-
level agreements could only improve the conditions stated in the industrial
agreement so that, over time, the ﬁrm-level agreements have become more
important for wage determination than the industry agreements. Although
more than 90 percent of French workers are covered by industrial agree-
ments throughout our analysis period (1976 to 1996), ﬁrm-level negotia-
tions outpaced renegotiations of industrywide agreements in most indus-
tries. The regular increases in the national minimum wage (in particular
those driven by the indexation to the average blue-collar wage rate) re-
sulted in the lowest categories on the collective pay scales in most industry
contracts for most occupations being below the national minimum by the
beginning of the 1990s. When this occurs, it is the national minimum wage,
and not the collectively bargained wage, that binds.
11.3.3 Product Markets
Our sample period for France is not one of intense product market com-
petition. Even though France, pushed by European institutions, started in
the 1990s to deregulate some industries, the process is far from complete.
During our sample period, near-monopolies operated in many industries.
Air France (airlines), Seita (cigarettes), Electricité de France (energy), and
Gaz de France (energy) are all examples of ﬁrms in which the State has a
majority equity stake and there are no local competitors (even though
France imports cigarettes and allows foreign airlines to land in France).
Entry into these industries was, and still is, heavily regulated. Surprisingly,
it is also the case in many other apparently competitive industries, such as
the retail trade, that entry regulations loomed and are still very important
(see Bertrand and Kramarz [2002] for the detrimental eﬀect of the loi Royer
on employment in the retail trade). Djankov et al. (2000) have also shown
that entry regulations, as measured by requirements to starting a new busi-
408 Francis Kramarz and Sébastien Perez-Duarteness in France, are common, time-consuming, and costly. This startup pro-
cess takes sixty-six days and sixteen diﬀerent legal and administrative steps
in France and only seven days and four steps in the United States.
11.3.4 Macroeconomic Conditions
During our sample period, the economy has lived through several cycles,
though the labor market has not. The ﬁrst years in our sample follow the
end of Trente Glorieuses, the thirty years of golden prosperity after World
War II. Unemployment increased steadily from around 3 percent in the be-
ginning of the 1970s to 10 percent in 1985. The years between 1987 and
1989 are two years where the economy returned to growth years (inciden-
tally, 1989 and 1990 are exceptionally good wine years), and the only ones
in which unemployment declined signiﬁcantly. Growth then drastically
slowed and unemployment soon increased, reaching 12 percent in 1996,
the last year of our sample.
11.4 The Heterogeneity of Wages
We will start ﬁrst by describing some sample wage statistics before delv-
ing into the depths of the distributions.
11.4.1 Levels
The central feature of the wages is that in real terms wages increase by
around 0.8 percent per year. The increase is higher for the ﬁrm average
wage than for the worker average wage. Only when the unemployment rate
decreased by a bit more than 1 percent between 1987 and 1989 did real
wages fall. (See ﬁgure 11.3.)
Wage increases were not shared equally between diﬀerent categories of
workers. Only from 1989 to 1996 did wages for young workers (twenty-ﬁve
to thirty) increase, whereas for workers aged between forty-ﬁve and ﬁfty,
the increase was high at around 1 percent per year (except for the 1987 to
1989 period). Youth unemployment was an increasing problem during the
whole period and may have held entry wages down during that period. (See
ﬁgure 11.4)
This increase in the real wage is also not constant across the wages. The
wages on the middle half of the distribution of wages increased by 0.7 per-
cent by year, on average, though the average wage increased by 0.8 percent.
The diﬀerence is explained by the higher increase in the lower wages, 1.0
percent per year. In ﬁgure 11.5we plot the increase in the log wage between
1977 and several years, at each percentile of the distribution. Three results
are striking between 1977 and 1996: for wages between percentiles 20 per-
cent and 95 percent: the increase in wages is constant, wage increases were
very high for the bottom part of the distribution, while top wages only re-
ceived a below average increase. Wages were compressed from below, while
Wage Structure in France, 1977–96 409most of the rest of the distribution is unaﬀected: the minimum wage was in-
creased in 1991 and 1992, while payroll taxes were reduced starting in 1994.
The ﬁrms had clear incentives to compress the wages around the minimum
wage so as to beneﬁt from the threshold-based exemptions. Because of this
reduction in labor cost, turnover was also lower for low-wage workers.
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Fig. 11.3 Average log wage across workers or ﬁrms
Fig. 11.4 Average log wage and age11.4.2 Variance
Another striking feature in the data is the stability of the wage distribu-
tion within ﬁrms for most of our sample period. Proof of this is found in
the distribution of the coeﬃcient of variation (CV) of wages (ﬁgure 11.6).
Between 1979 and 1989, the CV of log wages was constant at around 9.5
percent, after a small decline at the beginning of the period. The real
change occurs between 1989 and 1996, where the CV decreased to 8.1 per-
cent. The CV of wages (as opposed to log wages) also experiences this sta-
bility followed by a strong decrease.
At the end of our sample period, between 1993 and 1996, the large de-
crease in payroll taxes, concentrated on the lower end of the distribution of
wages (up to 1.33 of the minimum wage), had a very sizeable impact on the
labor market. Kramarz and Philippon (2001) estimate that the decrease in
payroll taxes had a positive impact on the rate of ﬁring of low-wage work-
ers. This cannot be conﬁrmed, however, through the turnover statistics: the
exit rate is constant between 1987 and 1996. The concentration of wages,
however, was altered, as we saw in the preceding.
11.4.3 Earnings Mobility
Buchinsky et al. (2003), while studying earnings mobility with a variety
of diﬀerent statistics, ﬁnd that between 1971 and 1977 mobility strongly de-
clined in France, and while the mobility stayed very low, no clear pattern
could be seen afterward. In our data, the distribution of wage changes is re-
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Fig. 11.5 Percentile-based increase in wages. Shift in the distribution of log wages,
since 1977 up to year 1996markably stable throughout our entire sample period, as can be surmised
from ﬁgure 11.7.
Furthermore, the distribution of wage changes for movers and stayers
(ﬁgure 11.8) is also very stable during all our sample period: wage change
for movers is much more dispersed, both in the upper part of the distribu-
tion and in the bottom part.
11.4.4 Turnover
The relationship between job change and wage is studied by Abowd,
Kramarz, and Roux (2006) in a model of joint mobility and wages by ﬁrm;
30 percent of the variance is explained by the axis high-turnover–low
wage–high returns to seniority versus low-turnover–high wage–low re-
turns to seniority.
Correlation between the average wage in the ﬁrm and exit and entry rates
is consistently negative throughout the years (see table 11.1).
Turnover is mainly procyclical in France (Dares 2003). However, the in-
teraction of diﬀerent eﬀects renders interpretation diﬃcult. Abowd, Cor-
bel, and Kramarz (1999, 182), with a diﬀerent data set, conclude that:
Adjusted establishment growth rates are procyclical (negatively related
to changes in the unemployment ratio) with an elasticity of –0.14 (0.02
robust standard error). The employment entry rate is weakly counter-
cyclical with an elasticity of 0.09 (0.04). The employment exit rate is
strongly countercyclical with an elasticity of 0.23 (0.06) and the invol-
untary exit rate displays essentially identical countercyclicality. The em-
ployment quit rate is weakly countercyclical with an elasticity of 0.02
(0.004). Finally, the retirement rate is procyclical with an elasticity of 
–0.22 (0.06).
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Fig. 11.6 Within-ﬁrm wage variance. Cumulative distribution of coeﬃcient of
variation, log wage within ﬁrmFig. 11.7 Log wage change. Cumulative distribution of wage change 
(observation   worker)
Fig. 11.8 Wage change for movers and for stayers
Table 11.1 Correlation at the ﬁrm level between average wage and exit and 
entry rates
1977 1979 1987 1989 1993 1996
Exit rate –0.12 –0.14 –0.11 –0.13 –0.10 –0.05
Entry rate –0.15 –0.17 –0.16 –0.16 –0.11 –0.12In our data, turnover is remarkably higher in 1977 than for all other years
in our sample period. For example, for our sample of large ﬁrms, the entry
rate (the proportion of new workers in each ﬁrm) was above 30 percent in
1977 but was at or below 26 percent for all the other years in our sample.
The entry and exit rates in 1977 are high throughout the entire distri-
bution, as can be seen in ﬁgures 11.9 to 11.12. This year excepted, the 
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Fig. 11.9 Average turnover
Fig. 11.10 Distribution of average ﬁrm exit ratesFig. 11.11 Distribution of average ﬁrm exit rates
Fig. 11.12 Distribution of average ﬁrm entry rates416 Francis Kramarz and Sébastien Perez-Duarte
Appendix
Table 11A.1 Macroeconomic conditions
Percentage Percentage   
Unemployment GDP 5  of part-time of women in 
Year rate GDP (%) years (%) workers labor force
1970 2.5 5.5 35.7
1971 2.7 4.8 5.8 36.1
1972 2.8 4.4 5.8 36.5
1973 2.7 5.4 5.9 36.8
1974 2.8 3.1 4.6 5.9 37.0
1975 4.1 –0.3 3.5 8.1 37.4
1976 4.5 4.2 3.4 8.1 38.0
1977 5.0 3.2 3.1 8.7 38.6
1978 5.3 3.4 2.7 7.9 39.0
1979 5.9 3.3 2.8 8.2 39.5
1980 6.3 1.6 3.1 8.3 39.9
1981 7.4 1.2 2.5 8.4 40.3
1982 8.1 2.6 2.4 9.2 40.8
1983 8.4 1.5 2.1 9.7 41.3
1984 9.8 1.6 1.7 10.3 41.8
1985 10.2 1.5 1.7 11.0 42.2
1986 10.4 2.4 1.9 11.8 42.5
1987 10.5 2.5 1.9 11.8 43.0
1988 10.0 4.6 2.5 12.1 43.1
1989 9.4 4.2 3.0 12.1 43.3
1990 8.9 2.6 3.3 12.0 43.4
1991 9.3 1.0 3.0 12.0 43.7
1992 10.2 1.5 2.8 12.7 44.2
1993 11.5 –0.9 1.7 13.9 44.5
1994 12.1 2.1 1.2 14.8 44.9
1995 11.4 1.7 1.1 15.6 45.0
1996 12.0 1.1 1.1 16.0 45.2
1997 12.1 1.9 1.2 16.8 45.4
1998 11.5 3.4 2.0 17.2 45.6
1999 10.8 3.2 2.3 17.3 45.7
2000 9.5 3.8 2.7 16.9 45.8
2001 8.7 2.1 2.9 16.4 45.9
2002 9.0 1.2 2.7 16.2 46.1
Source: Unemployment rate is taken from the International Labor Organization.
distribution of exit and entry rates is very similar from one year to the
other. We can observe that a positive number of ﬁrms exhibit exit rates of
one (the ﬁrm is destroyed). On average, 3 percent of the ﬁrms close every
year.Fig. 11A.1 Real minimum wage in France and in the United States ( 100 in 1960)
Fig. 11A.2 Macroeconomic conditions in France
Note: Dashed lines represent our sample years.References
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